TandemTrace
Signal file // INC-003Severity // HighConfidence // Confirmed
Public-safe true-positive investigation · Script execution

PowerShell download chain confirmed as malicious

Confirmed malicious activity

Public-safe case study Customer names, domains, employee identifiers, exact user addresses, internal evidence locations, and case-specific identifiers have been removed or replaced. Quantitative findings and defensive lessons are retained for educational use.

Executive assessment

At 14:22 UTC, WINWORD.EXE launched hidden PowerShell with a 1,840-character encoded command on WKSTN-HR-118. PowerShell retrieved a 286 KB second-stage script, reconstructed it in memory, and registered scheduled-task persistence. Script-block, DNS, proxy, AMSI, and endpoint telemetry confirm a malicious download chain. The host was isolated in 10 minutes 49 seconds.

1Affected workstation
6Correlated stages
286 KBDownloaded content
12,418Peer endpoints searched

95% autonomous investigation. 100% human authority.

TandemTrace AI agents completed 38 of 40 recorded investigation actions autonomously. The human analyst retained final verdict approval and containment authorization.

Investigation ownership

Agents reconstructed the chain. The analyst controlled the consequential decisions.

95% AI agents
38Autonomous actions2Human decisions
Investigation stageAIHuman
Evidence collection100
Script decoding and enrichment90
Cross-source correlation80
Hypothesis testing60
Scope and prevalence50
Verdict approval01
Containment authorization01

Agent-to-human handoff

Orange = AI · black diamond = human · green = response
Agent collected Office ancestry and decoded the PowerShell launcher.
Agent joined DNS, proxy, script-block, and AMSI telemetry.
Agent reconstructed the download, memory execution, and persistence chain.
Agent enriched the infrastructure and recovered payload artifacts.
Agent searched 12,418 peers and tested benign administration hypotheses.
Agent assembled the evidence-backed true-positive recommendation.
Human analyst approved the true-positive verdict.
Human analyst authorized endpoint containment.
Endpoint isolation completed.

Investigation dataset

Case context
Alert source
EDR · Suspicious PowerShell
First observed
2026-07-22 14:22:31 UTC
Host
WKSTN-HR-118 · Windows 11 23H2
Identity
j.ortiz · People Operations
Origin
benefits-review.docm attachment
Telemetry reviewed
Endpoint
1,864 events · ±30 minutes
PowerShell
19 events · 3 script blocks
Network
6 DNS queries · 2 proxy GETs
Prevalence
12,418 endpoints · 30 days
Sources
EDR, SIEM, 4104, AMSI, DNS, proxy
OUTLOOK.EXEPID 5080 · attachment
WINWORD.EXEPID 7744 · macro
powershell.exePID 8120 · encoded
in-memory stageScript block 3/3
schtasks.exePID 8468 · persistence
ArtifactSanitized valueObservationAssessment
PowerShell command1,840 encoded charactersHidden; noninteractiveNo peer baseline match
Download domaincdn-sync.invalidFirst-seen; 6 queriesReserved replacement
Second-stage SHA-256c027…e114286 KB responseUnique enterprise-wide
Scheduled taskBrowserUpdateCheckRuns every 30 minutesMasquerading persistence

Visual investigation brief

Original detection

EDR alert · rule v6.4
Alert IDEDR-PS-8821
Detected14:22:34 UTC
RuleOffice spawning encoded PowerShell
HostWKSTN-HR-118
Command length1,840 characters
Initial severityMedium · 68/100

Investigation funnel

1,864 → 1
1,864Endpoint events reviewed
63Related process/script events
19PowerShell events
9Corroborating signals
1Confirmed incident

Evidence confidence matrix

Cross-source support
FindingEndpointScript / AMSINetworkConfidence
Malicious document chainConfirmed
Payload downloadConfirmed
Memory executionContextHigh
PersistenceConfirmed
Credential theft / exfiltrationNoneNoneNoneNot observed
Initial alert

Suspicious command line

  • Office → PowerShell
  • Encoded and hidden flags
  • One endpoint identified
  • Payload and impact unknown
Completed investigation

Six-stage malicious chain

  • Two payload responses recovered
  • Memory execution reconstructed
  • Scheduled persistence confirmed
  • 12,418 endpoints searched

Layered execution chain

14:22:31–14:24:18
Document openedbenefits-review.docm
14:22:31
Encoded launcherPowerShell · 1,840 chars
14:22:34
Remote retrieval4.2 KB bootstrap
14:22:36
String reconstructionScript block 2/3
14:22:38
Memory invocation286 KB module
14:23:02
PersistenceScheduled task
14:24:18

Multi-source timeline

14:22–14:34 UTC
Endpoint
Script 4104
DNS / Proxy
Task
Response
14:2214:2514:2814:3114:34

Evidence that changed the verdict

Suspicious parentage

A word-processing application spawned PowerShell with hidden-window and encoded-command flags—absent from the user’s 30-day baseline.

Recovered script block

Logging showed a downloader, string reconstruction, and in-memory invocation. The command content had no administrative business purpose.

External infrastructure

DNS and proxy telemetry tied the process to a newly registered domain with no prior enterprise prevalence.

Persistence attempt

The chain created a scheduled task masquerading as browser maintenance and referencing a user-profile script.

Correlated timeline

14:22:31 · Document opened

Email attachment opened by the targeted user.

14:22:34 · PowerShell launched

Hidden encoded command starts beneath the document process.

14:22:36 · Stage two downloaded

PowerShell resolves and contacts a first-seen domain.

14:23:02 · Memory execution

Recovered script block invokes reconstructed code without writing the final payload to disk.

14:24:18 · Persistence created

Scheduled task registered under a misleading maintenance name.

14:33:20 · Host isolated

Host isolated; task removal and token revocation initiated.

Competing hypotheses tested

HypothesisTestDisposition
Legitimate login or deployment scriptCompared parent process, signer, command-line pattern, domain age, and management records.Rejected: no management job or approved script matched.
Benign document automationChecked document macros and expected child processes against peer activity.Rejected: encoded hidden PowerShell and network retrieval were anomalous.
Malicious staged downloaderJoined process ancestry, script blocks, DNS, proxy, and persistence telemetry.Confirmed.

Confirmed scope and uncertainty

Confirmed by evidence
  • Macro, encoded PowerShell, download, memory execution, and task creation occurred on one host.
  • Two HTTP 200 responses delivered 4.2 KB and 286 KB.
  • Three script blocks reconstruct the observed chain.
  • No matching indicators appeared on 12,418 peers.
Not yet confirmed
  • The final in-memory module was only partially recovered.
  • No evidence establishes credential access, lateral movement, or data theft.
  • The delivery path before the mail gateway remains unknown.
  • No named-family or actor attribution is made.

Containment and follow-up

Isolate and collect

Preserve script-block logs, PowerShell operational logs, memory, task XML, document, and browser artifacts.

Remove persistence

Disable the scheduled task and quarantine all staged scripts and the originating document.

Block and hunt

Block the infrastructure and search for process ancestry, command patterns, task name, and DNS indicators.

Strengthen controls

Enforce script-block logging, constrained language where applicable, and document-origin protections.

Technical evidence and response

PowerShell telemetry correlation

One chain · five sources
Time UTCSourceRecordObservationContribution
14:22:34.114EDRProcessCreateWINWORD → hidden powershellSuspicious ancestry
14:22:34.307PowerShell4104 / 78102Encoded launcher decodedIntent established
14:22:36.051DNSQuerycdn-sync.invalid first seenInfrastructure joined
14:22:39.884ProxyHTTP GET286 KB responsePayload transfer
14:23:02.440AMSI / 4104Script block 3/3In-memory invocationExecution confirmed
14:24:18.702Security log4698Scheduled task createdPersistence confirmed

Download waterfall

Sanitized network evidence
14:22:36GET /bootstrap200
4.2 KB · loader
14:22:39GET /content200
286 KB · module
14:23:06POST /status204
0.8 KB · check-in
Script block 1 · 14:22:34

Environment and launcher

[encoded launcher redacted] → hidden execution contextRecord 78102 · 1,126 characters
Script block 2 · 14:22:38

Retrieval and reconstruction

[sanitized web request] → byte-array reconstructionRecord 78105 · 2,804 characters
Script block 3 · 14:23:02

Memory and persistence

[in-memory invocation] → scheduled-task definitionRecord 78111 · 3,422 characters

Baseline comparison

12,418 endpoints · 30 days
AttributeIncidentEnterprise baselineInterpretation
Word → PowerShellPresent0 occurrencesHighly anomalous
Encoded PowerShellPresent14 approved occurrencesNot conclusive alone
Hidden windowPresent3 approved occurrencesRare but explainable
First-seen domainPresent0 approved occurrencesStrong corroboration
Task after documentPresent0 matching chainsMalicious sequence
Process queryParent = WINWORD · Child = PowerShell
EDR · 30d1 host
Script queryScriptBlockHash = c027…e114
SIEM1 host
Persistence queryTaskName = BrowserUpdateCheck
Security 46981 host
Impact queryCredential access · SMB · RDP · upload
24h review0 matches

Negative evidence reviewed

Absence tested—not assumed
QuestionSources / windowResultMeaning
Did the chain execute elsewhere?EDR + 4104 · 12,418 hosts · 30d0 additionalScope remains one host
Did credential access follow?EDR memory-access telemetry · 24h0 matchesCredential theft not observed
Was lateral movement attempted?SMB, RDP, WinRM, service creation · 24h0 matchesNo confirmed lateral movement
Was data uploaded?Proxy + DNS · 24hOnly 0.8 KB check-inNo material exfiltration observed

Response status

Closing review
Endpoint isolatedComplete · 14:33
Scheduled task removedComplete · 14:39
User tokens revokedComplete · 14:41
Enterprise huntComplete · 12,418
Memory capability analysisPartial
Pre-gateway delivery pathUnknown

Evidence ledger

Sanitized chain of evidence
IDSourceEvent UTCCollectedEntityVerdict contribution
P-01EDR14:22:3414:22:35powershell.exeAlert and ancestry
P-02PowerShell 410414:22:3414:22:36Script block 1Launcher recovered
P-03Proxy14:22:3914:22:51286 KB responseDownload confirmed
P-04AMSI14:23:0214:23:04Memory stageExecution corroborated
P-05Security 469814:24:1814:24:20Scheduled taskPersistence confirmed

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TechniqueObserved behavior
T1204.002 · Malicious FileUser opened the weaponized attachment.
T1059.001 · PowerShellEncoded hidden PowerShell execution.
T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferSecond-stage content retrieved from external infrastructure.
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationEncoded command and reconstructed strings.
T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskUser-context persistence through a misleading task.